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Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the global audit of field security management

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Abbreviations

EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Missions covered by the audit

Peacekeeping missions

MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

Political and peacebuilding missions

BONUCA	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic
UNOGBIS	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNOMB	United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville
UNOWA	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa
UNTOP	United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding

Summary

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted a global audit of field security management in 15 field missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and 5 political and peacebuilding missions led by the Department of Political Affairs. OIOS planned and conducted the audits in close coordination with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator* and the United Nations Development Programme. In assessing the effectiveness of field security management in those duty stations, the audit had one principal aim: to help enhance the security of United Nations personnel in the field during the current period of heightened risk.

OIOS provided the Secretary-General with the summary of the main findings, which were generally in line with those contained in the report of the Secretary-General on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations (A/59/365 and Corr.1 and A/59/365/Add.1 and Corr.1).

The audit found that basic security arrangements exist or are currently being improved in the majority of the missions audited and that in some duty stations, good practices prevail. It also found that the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have recognized the need to strengthen security management and in recent years had established some cooperative methods for doing so.

However, the audit showed a considerable need for improvements in the following areas: (a) security structures, both at Headquarters and in the field; (b) security plans and policies and their implementation; (c) deployment and administration of personnel; (d) budgeting and resourcing; (e) coordination with the host Government and the external military force and among United Nations agencies; and (f) physical security.

A related conclusion is that it does not appear to be sound practice for the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, a sizeable entity staffed largely with security professionals (including seven posts funded under the support account for peacekeeping operations, to provide advice and assistance on security in field missions led by the Department), to be responsible for the security of United Nations agencies in the field, while the Department, whose security staff is minuscule in comparison, is responsible for the security of tens of thousands of peacekeeping staff.

While the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have implemented some security changes and issued the number of special security guidelines since the attack against United Nations offices in Baghdad, the audit found that five months after the release of the report of the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel, many of the shortcomings identified by the Panel still need to be addressed.

The major audit findings of OIOS in each area needing improvement include the following:

Security structure

- Roles and responsibilities of various security governing bodies and staff needed clarification.
- There is a need to re-examine the countrywide security organization in various countries, which has in some cases led to confusion.
- Reporting lines of security officers were not clearly defined.

Coordination with the host Government and external military forces and among United Nations agencies

- In some duty stations, no official memorandum of understanding or protocol (status of forces/mission agreement) on security issues was signed with the host Government and/or the external military forces.
- A frequent pattern was poor attendance by agencies at countrywide security management team meetings.

Security plans and policies and their implementation

- In some duty stations, the security plan was either incomplete or out of date. Also, in many cases, security plans were not tested or rehearsed.
- The security warden system, in some missions, was deficient. Internal communications between staff and the mission security section was poor. There was not enough awareness of the importance of security arrangements among United Nations personnel in some duty stations.
- There is a need to review the mechanism for declaring security phases.
- Minimum operating security standards recommended by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator had not yet been established by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations as a policy requirement for missions led by the Department.

Budgeting and resourcing

- Some missions had insufficient resources to ensure compliance with security requirements.
- No separate budget line was established for security costs in mission budgets for proper planning and monitoring of resources provided and expenditures made.

Deployment and administration of personnel

- A common pattern in many missions was a significant number of vacancies in the posts allocated for security section. The vacancy rate varied from 39 to 86 per cent, and in some missions vacancies remained open for two years.
- Security training for designated officials, some members of the security management team and staff with security responsibilities was often inadequate. Also, in some missions, staff members (up to 80 per cent of interviewed personnel) have not completed the basic security training developed by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator.

Physical security

- In some missions, security arrangements for officials designated as "at risk" were inadequate; close protection was not always provided to high-ranking officials and security guards were not armed.
- Perimeter security in many missions needed improvement.
- In some missions, access control procedures relating to visitors' identification, registration and physical screening needed to be improved.

OIOS makes a series of recommendations to the Secretary-General, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations which, if implemented, would improve the security of United Nations personnel and facilities in the field.

* By section XI of its resolution 59/276 of 23 December 2004, the General Assembly decided to establish the Department of Safety and Security, replacing the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator.

I. Introduction

1. While the primary responsibility for the security and protection of United Nations personnel and of its assets rests with the Government of the host country, each mission and agency of the United Nations system is responsible for establishing security arrangements commensurate with their operational responsibilities within the framework of the United Nations field security management system.

2. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for the security and safety of peacekeeping personnel, while the United Nations Security Coordinator provides him with the necessary technical advice and assistance to discharge that responsibility. For that purpose, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator has been allocated posts under the support account for peacekeeping operations. These currently comprise five Professional and two General Service posts to deal with security management in peacekeeping operations. From its inception until March 2002, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was not involved to any marked extent in security management issues. All support to the missions was provided directly by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. Relations at Headquarters were mostly confined to contacts at the desk officer level on an ad hoc basis. In response to this unsatisfactory situation, the Department commissioned an independent study in April/May 2001, which provided it with a list of urgent recommendations to strengthen security management in the field. One outcome was the informal designation of the Chief of the Department's Situation Centre as focal point for security in March 2002. Although approval of a full-time post for that purpose is still pending, the part-time arrangement has enabled the Department to start developing a modest capacity for dealing with security management issues, based on close coordination with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator.

3. In view of the high risks resulting from the changing security environment and the growing concern with respect to the security and safety of United Nations personnel and assets worldwide, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in close coordination with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and a security expert acting at the time as a temporary consultant to the Deputy Secretary-General, identified the need to review global field security procedures as a matter of priority.

4. OIOS conducted its audit from May to July 2004 at 15 missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and 5 led by the Department of Political Affairs. OIOS assessed the security procedures in place, the level of coordination between entities involved in security operations, and the adequacy of security staffing resources; and determined whether there were problems that prevented the missions and offices from implementing their security and emergency planning mandates.

5. A draft of the present report was transmitted to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator for review. Their comments have been incorporated in the report, where appropriate, and are shown in italics.

II. Background

6. The Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General have issued several policy documents recognizing the paramount importance of the security and safety of United Nations personnel. In one of these documents, dated 28 August 2002 (A/57/365), the Secretary-General set out an inter-organizational security framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system. The document outlines the responsibilities of the various entities and individuals within the United Nations system of organizations involved in security management.

7. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator is responsible for developing and coordinating policy guidelines for all United Nations establishments/missions. The United Nations Security Coordinator acts on behalf of and reports directly to the Secretary-General to ensure a coherent response by the United Nations to any emergency situation. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator works closely with other departments that are involved in security management, including the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations is responsible and accountable to the Secretary-General for providing overall guidance and specific directives for ensuring the security and safety of all personnel — civilian, police and military — and assets deployed to missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The Safety and Security Service manages the security of United Nations facilities around the world, and provides close protection to senior United Nations staff members. United Nations agencies, funds and programmes also operate complementary security management structures within their operations.

8. While the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for the security and safety of peacekeeping personnel, the United Nations Security Coordinator provides him with the necessary technical advice and assistance to discharge that responsibility. To develop standard operating procedures and provide training in some of the critical security management areas, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations organized three security workshops for chief security officers in peacekeeping missions in July 2002, August 2003 and June 2004. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator has developed the risk management doctrine, which serves as the basis for the Organization's policy on risk management, and issued the minimum operating security standards.

9. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations also initiated changes in its security operations in peacekeeping missions with the issuance by the Department of a new policy and standard operating procedures for a trial period of one year effective October 2003. In December 2003, the Department issued a field security policy for implementation in peacekeeping missions, and in January 2004, it initiated a mission security management programme, which is being developed as a management tool to assist those responsible and accountable for the security of the Department's personnel and assets to carry out their responsibilities. As indicated in the field security policy, the mission security management programme incorporated policy, direction, guidance, and procedures issued under the authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

10. In his report dated 11 October 2004 on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations (A/59/365) the Secretary-General proposed major changes to the existing security organization at the United Nations Secretariat and an increase in the number of security personnel, particularly in the field. OIOS provided the Secretary-General with a summary of the main findings of the global audit, which were generally in line with those contained in the report of the Secretary-General. The current report is intended to further complement the report of the Secretary-General by presenting the OIOS findings from the perspective of the security conditions found to exist in the field.

III. Security structure issues

A. Different security structures exist in the field

11. The audit noted that different security structures prevailed in the 20 duty stations reviewed. In some cases, the heads of missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations are appointed as designated officials for the entire country (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) and United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)) and in other cases they are appointed only for the mandated area of operation of the mission, e.g., the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Finally, in some cases, the head of mission is not appointed as designated official, but, instead, a deputy special representative of the Secretary-General or a country representative of an agency, fund or programme is named.

12. While OIOS focused on security arrangements within peacekeeping and political missions, the audits did take note of the broader presence of other agencies, such as UNDP, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO), operating within each of the countries visited. While the extent of administrative dependency on UNDP may vary from country to country, all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes are members of the United Nations field security management system and therefore fall under the authority of the designated official.

13. All of the "in country" agencies and organizations are part of the United Nations field security management system, yet security of United Nations personnel and assets is disparate among United Nations agencies/programmes and missions. The separation of peacekeeping security from the United Nations field security management system is a historical approach that increases the probability of uneven implementation of the United Nations security policy. As stated in August 2003 by a team of consultants in its report on the evaluation of United Nations security arrangements, "there must be one United Nations Security policy ...", and "... there needs to be one office as a central and coordination office for the three current forms of delivering security, i.e., at Headquarters, in the field for agencies and for peacekeeping". OIOS is pleased to note that as a result of the recent review by the Deputy Secretary-General of documents A/59/365 and Corr.1 and A/59/365/Add.1 and Corr.1, the need for consolidation in the delivery of security services is now being addressed by the Organization's security governing bodies.

B. Roles and responsibilities in establishing and implementing security policies and procedures need clarification

14. Some missions experienced difficulties in identifying and clearly understanding the roles of various security governing bodies and individuals. There was also some confusion as to whether the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator or the Department of Peacekeeping Operations security standards and operational guidelines should be applied in areas where both peacekeeping missions and other United Nations organizations operate. Some missions expressed the concern that the responsibilities of the Department and the Office were not adequately clarified with regard to performance and oversight of field security and that the guidance they provided to the field missions lacked cohesion.

15. For example, on 15 September 2002, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator addressed a letter to all designated officials, field security coordinators and security focal points, stating that "one of the factors that became extremely clear during the recent risk and threat assessment exercise which was conducted on an inter-agency basis was the fact that many duty stations are still not minimum operating security standards compliant". The Office requested each duty station to provide a detailed report, by 22 September 2002, on those areas where the duty station was not minimum operating security standards compliant.

16. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations subsequently contacted all chief security officers in the peacekeeping missions, noting that the request of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator did not apply to the peacekeeping component for which the issuance of the directive was the clear prerogative of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. In that regard, OIOS noted that the minimum operating security standards recommended by the Office had not been established by the Department as a policy requirement for the missions it led.

17. In the opinion of OIOS, the lack of clear leadership at Headquarters regarding field security matters creates confusion. There is a need for uniform security standards and an established compendium of procedures comprising all security-related policies and procedures in order to facilitate their consistent implementation and monitoring. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator in security-related matters in peacekeeping missions is dependent on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations instructing the peacekeeping missions to implement recommendations of the Office.

18. The roles and responsibilities of the security bodies within the mission area of operations need to be clarified. For example, the responsibility of security personnel of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator in Afghanistan and those of the UNAMA security staff need to be clearly defined, to avoid duplication of efforts in the region. Similarly, in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), confusion existed about the roles of the head of the mission and the designated officials for Pakistan and India, concerning security matters.

19. In some long-established missions, the security organizational structure requires the establishment of a civilian security post. There is a need for a thorough review of the roles and responsibilities to be assigned to the new civilian field security officer and his/her place in the overall security structure in relation to the

head of mission, the chief administrative officer and the military, to ensure the continued coordinated execution of the security programme in field missions.

C. Appointment of designated officials and their deputies needs to be reviewed

20. In each country where the United Nations has a presence, one official is appointed as the designated official for security. This official is accountable to the Secretary-General through the United Nations Security Coordinator. Depending on the particular circumstances at the duty station, the heads of peacekeeping missions or other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes may also be appointed as designated officials.

21. However, the administrative structures for providing security differed in several countries. For example, there were two designated officials with different areas of responsibility in Eritrea (UNMEE), and several deputy designated officials in Israel and the autonomous territories. In the opinion of OIOS, the existence of two designated officials or several deputy designated officials in the same area of operations has had an adverse impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the security programme. The respective roles of two designated officials in Eritrea, for instance, needed to be clarified since the audit found that it caused confusion in the authority to declare or revise security phases in the country. In the opinion of OIOS, the appointment of three deputy designated officials and two field security coordination officers for various areas in Israel and the autonomous territories also needs reconsideration as it is not consistent with the United Nations security management accountability framework, which does not provide for such security structures.

22. OIOS further noted that UNDP resident representatives, appointed as designated officials in some countries, had limited operational and financial ability to implement and oversee the security programme, since the countrywide security plan, in such cases, was entirely dependent on the peacekeeping mission located in the region. OIOS believes that there is a need to reconsider the appointment of the designated officials in some duty stations based on the security-related resources of the missions or offices in the particular country.

D. Composition and performance of security management teams need to be improved

23. A security management team consists of the country representatives of each United Nations agency, fund, programme and mission present at the duty station, who advise the designated official on all security-related matters. Generally, OIOS found that the composition of the teams was adequate. However, in some countries, they did not include representatives of all United Nations organizations and agencies at the duty station.

24. The composition of security management teams varied. Some missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have their own mission security management team or security management committee apart from the countrywide team, and other country operations had one security management team. This

resulted in the need for more coordination between the security management teams on a mission and countrywide level. Also, some mission teams needed to revise their composition and to strongly reaffirm their responsibilities (UNMEE and MINURSO).

25. One of the main responsibilities of security management team's members is to meet on a regular basis to review the prevailing situation and ensure that security is being managed effectively at the duty station. The security management team is also responsible for establishing minimum operating security standards at the duty station and monitoring its implementation. In some duty stations, security management teams were not successful in carrying out their mandated responsibilities, as follows:

(a) Security management team's meetings were not regularly convened and were not being attended by all members, and heads of agencies were frequently absent from the meetings in some duty stations (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and United Nations agencies in Israel and the autonomous territories);

(b) Minimum operating security standards and minimum operating residential security standards had not yet been fully established in many missions; in addition, the application of minimum operating residential security standards needed clarification;

(c) No timeline was set for the implementation of minimum operating security standards in 9 out of 20 audited field missions.

26. One of the common problems was a lack of monitoring of the implementation of minimum operating security standards. For example, the auditors reviewed the revised minimum operating security standards for Liberia for compliance and found that, while there were 77 categories of items in the revised standards, the mission had not complied fully with 21 items. In some duty stations, country-specific standards were not yet approved by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, and hence had not yet been implemented.

27. At UNMEE, a detailed review of the mission security management team's performance against the mandated responsibilities identified the following problems:

(a) Major security policy issues, e.g., the new Department of Peacekeeping Operations policy and standard operating procedures, were not tabled as an agenda item in the mission security management team meetings;

(b) There was no evidence that the mission team had discussed or reviewed the security plan and its rehearsal to ensure that it was functioning and effective;

(c) The Mission did not have an up-to-date list of its personnel. There was no documentation to show that the team had either reviewed or discussed this matter in any of its meetings;

(d) The audit team's survey of the zone wardens indicated that they were neither trained nor equipped to carry out their responsibilities;

(e) There was no evidence that the mission security management team monitored and ensured compliance with minimum operating security standards;

(f) The security management team did not maintain minutes of its meetings.

28. In the opinion of OIOS, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should draw attention of the respective designated officials and heads of the mission to unsatisfactory performance when the security management teams do not fully carry out their duties.

29. It should also be noted that neither the report of the Secretary-General of 28 August 2002 (A/57/365), nor the United Nations *Field Security Handbook* delineated clearly the roles and responsibilities of the mission security management teams and their coordination with the countrywide security management teams. There is a need to specify in the United Nations security policy documents the mission security management team's objectives and terms of reference.

E. Mission security sections need to be reorganized

30. In such missions as UNMISET, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), UNMOGIP and the United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa (UNOWA), security organization and responsibilities generally complied with the accountability framework for the United Nations field security management system. However, the security sections' organizational structure in some missions needed significant improvements, including the exercise of required oversight by senior mission officials and effective management of day-to-day security operations. Also, the security control environment and the mission security standard operating procedures needed to be re-examined to consider the broad spectrum of mission operations. In some cases, missions have different security operations and structures depending on who performs the security functions, military or civilian personnel.

31. OIOS made a number of observations concerning security organization arrangements and established models. Problems at some duty stations are outlined below:

(a) At the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and UNIFIL the absence of a civilian mission security officer position and the short-term military rotation policy, coupled with a shortage of senior military officers, seriously jeopardized efforts by the force commander and head of mission to develop, implement and sustain an effective mission and countrywide security management programme. OIOS was pleased to note that on 18 June 2004, the General Assembly, in its resolutions 58/306 and 58/307 endorsed the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for funding additional chief of security posts at these missions;

(b) At the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), there was no documented management framework linking the chief security officer, the chief military observer and chief of civilian police regarding the implementation of security policy in the case of a crisis. Such a framework should link the structure, coordination of roles, information sharing and actual operating methods to ensure an adequate management response in case of an emergency;

(c) The presence of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East within the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) headquarters compound in Jerusalem requires administrative review, to determine the extent to which this may pose a security risk.

32. While some missions have a civilian security section, in other missions, military personnel essentially perform the security functions. The situation has led to the disparate application of standard operating procedures. In this regard, responsibilities within the new structures/security organization models envisaged by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations need to be revisited, especially insofar as security in older missions will be "jointly" managed by military and civilian personnel. Command, control and accountability of the security management programme need to be clarified at UNTSO, UNDOF, UNIFIL, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and UNMEE. Further, the Department's policy does not address how military and civilian security capabilities are forged into an effective security command and control structure under the chief security officer.

33. OIOS observed that the planning, coordination and control of the security function needed improvement to ensure the capability and readiness of the mission's security components to perform their mandate (UNFICYP, UNIFIL and UNTSO).

34. Organizational problems regarding security in some missions were also caused by a poor appreciation of the importance of security (UNOWA, UNMEE). In the opinion of OIOS, the heads of missions must provide stronger leadership and more active direction and oversight to ensure implementation of an effective mission security programme.

F. Appropriate reporting lines and procedures need to be established

35. The OIOS review of reporting procedures in mission security frameworks found that accountability needed to be improved in such missions as the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). For example, according to the standard operating procedures, the chief security officer serves as the mission security adviser with direct access to the head of mission on all security-related matters. He/she heads the security section under the supervision of the director of administration. However, OIOS found that the chief security officers did not report to and were not evaluated by the respective heads of missions in these missions. In addition, there was confusion and reluctance, on the part of some chief administrative officers, to implement fully this reporting requirement.

36. Moreover, the chief security officers were often classified at "lower" grade level job categories (some at the FS-5/4 level and some in the P-4/3 level). In addition, the current recruitment practice of selecting ex-military officers for Professional category security posts such as chief security officers, without simultaneously addressing the requirements of the security function, including apparent disparities in "position classifications to actual responsibilities", was creating an undercurrent of personnel dissatisfaction within the security staff community in some missions.

37. While the composition of the military units dedicated to security planning, facilities security and investigations generally complied with the requirements set out in the generic structure of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, there was a need, in some missions, such as UNIFIL, UNDOF, UNTSO and UNFICYP, to define military and civilian coordination, reporting lines, and accountability for each security component.

38. Another reporting issue observed at UNMEE and UNTSO related to security accountability at the countrywide level. There was little awareness in the missions of the accountability and working relationships with regard to the roles played by the designated officials for the country and individual sectors/regions.

IV. Coordination with host Governments, external military forces and among United Nations security entities

39. OIOS reviewed the coordination among the security entities at the duty stations. Generally, inter-agency coordination was inadequate and communication and cooperation with host Governments and other security partners needed strengthening at MINURSO, UNMIK, UNOGBIS and UNAMA. It should be noted, however, that in some duty stations, such as UNMISET and UNMOGIP, coordination between the agencies and with the host government was satisfactory. For example, a weekly briefing was made to the Government by the head of the mission in UNMISET on security-related issues. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNMIK had undertaken a major overhaul of its security procedures. The Department further stated that that included strengthening the coordination with United Nations agencies, the civilian police and the Kosovo Force. The Department also clarified that the local authorities did not have responsibilities in the reserved area of security and the rule of law in general, as UNMIK fulfilled the governance role as mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999.*

40. While the primary responsibility for the security of United Nations staff members and property in the country rests with the host Government, in six duty stations no official memorandum of understanding or protocol for assisting the mission in case of a crisis had been signed with the host Government. There was a need to negotiate or renegotiate with foreign embassies and other partners involved in the plan to secure safe havens, regrouping points, and evacuation means such as air or sea transportation (MINURSO, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and UNOGBIS). For example, MINURSO should improve its internal coordination as well as coordination with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and local authorities on security matters such as preparing and formalizing an evacuation plan (through Algeria) for the liaison office at Tindouf.

41. In another case, there was a perception that the evacuation of United Nations personnel will be managed and arranged by the French forces stationed in Dakar. However, in his interview with the audit team, the commander of the French forces clarified that the priority for evacuation is French citizens followed by European Union (EU) nationals. Assistance to all others, including United Nations staff, would be dependent on their capacity to assist at that stage. He also added that there was no standing agreement with either the United Nations or any other country, and

if the United Nations required evacuation of its staff in an emergency, it should obtain a formal agreement at the highest levels in New York Headquarters. OIOS also observed a similar situation in UNAMA. There was no formal protocol with the Coalition Forces, the combat arm of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for providing security assistance to United Nations personnel.

42. Also, coordination of the security function within some missions needed significant improvement to ensure the capability and readiness of the missions' security section in performing its mandate and the operational application of the accountability framework (UNMEE, UNDOF and UNTSO). The audit teams made specific recommendations in their respective reports issued in the field concerning improved coordination.

43. Coordination between the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on security policy issues also needed improvement. For example, on 22 April 2004, the Office approved minimum operating residential security standards for Eritrea with immediate effect. However, the directive was referred to the Department's Security Operations for an opinion as to its "applicability for UNMEE" only on 27 May 2004.

V. Security plans and policies and their implementation

A. Security plans need to be developed and tested

44. The security plan is the main component of the security system and the primary management tool for security preparedness at the duty station. In missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the security plan is the main part of the field security management programme, initiated by the Department and presented to all heads of missions led by the Department in January 2004. In accordance with the requirements of the accountability framework for the United Nations field security management system (A/57/365), the designated official ensures the observance of the arrangements detailed in the United Nations *Field Security Handbook* and develops and implements the security plan for the duty station with the aim of maintaining the security and safety of the United Nations system personnel and operations. It should be noted, however, that the Department is still in the process of reviewing and incorporating peacekeeping personnel into the framework for accountability.

45. Most of the duty stations had security plans detailing the essential security elements, such as an evacuation plan, crises management plan and other established requirements. However, OIOS observed numerous cases of non-compliance with the provisions set out in the security plans and noted the following deficiencies that will hinder the plan's effectiveness in responding to a contingency, if not rectified immediately:

(a) While the standard operating procedures required that security plans in the area of operations need to be subjected to rigorous drill, evaluation and appropriate modification, in consultation with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, many missions failed to meet the requirement;

(b) Drills and rehearsals to simulate emergency situations were not carried out in some missions;

(c) The security plans were not finalized or updated, in some cases, for more than one year;

(d) The standard operating procedures for an emergency situation and the crisis management plan, including such possible scenarios as kidnapping, death, arrest or detention of staff, were not developed;

(e) Evacuation and medical plans in some missions were not developed or rehearsed. The OIOS review showed that the evacuation plan had not been rehearsed in 17 missions, and the medical evacuation plan in 13 of the 20 audited duty stations;

(f) The medical and evacuation capability was often insufficient;

(g) Mission security procedures needed improvement in the areas of institutional framework, policy direction and implementation of security plans.

46. There were also critical observations attributable to missions and countrywide security plans. For example, UNOCI had no detailed mission-specific security plan and no formalization, documentation or dissemination of the processes and procedures for the mission security operations. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNOCI was currently reviewing its security plan to address the deficiencies highlighted by the draft report and expected to complete the project by 31 January 2005.* While the countrywide security plan for Israel and the autonomous territories was comprehensive and reflected contributions from 15 United Nations agencies and missions, there were agencies that remained outside the plan, unnecessarily putting their staff at risk.

47. The United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB) was not ready for an emergency situation owing to the following critical issues: an evacuation boat required repairs, fire extinguishers had not been maintained since 1998, telephone lines were sometimes out of order owing to late payment of bills and radio communication had not yet been commissioned. In the opinion of OIOS, these deficiencies require urgent management attention.

48. At UNMEE, the evacuation part of the security plan had not been updated or rehearsed since March 2002, which created a critical security risk. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that the UNMEE-wide security and evacuation plan, which was under revision at the time of the audit, had since been completed.* UNMIK had not developed a crises management plan or emergency procedures. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNMIK was in the process of further improving its crisis management plan, based on the lessons learned from the March 2004 violence and it had updated its mission-wide security plan and evacuation plan to accommodate the changing environmental factors.* Similar shortcomings were identified by the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel. In its 3 March 2004 report, the panel stated that "the lack of contingency planning by the United Nations for an attack with a large number of casualties manifested itself in the rescue mission. There was no systematic or organized response from staff members in relation to command posts, points of assembly or the tracking of casualties as they left the site either by their own means or by medical evacuation. There was also a shortage of medical supplies and first aid kits."

B. Security warden system needs to be improved and staff lists need to be updated on a daily basis

49. In its report, issued on 3 March 2004, the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel stated that "some agencies were in blatant non-compliance in relation to staff lists, which led to a difficult situation on 19 August when no one could give accurate numbers of the staff in the Canal Hotel or account for other staff in the country who could be in danger and might need to be evacuated". Although some time has passed since the Panel made its observation, the OIOS audit observed that this shortcoming has not been addressed in several missions.

50. Often lists of staff, including dependants, where applicable, and personnel contact information were either outdated or improperly maintained. For example, in UNMIK, the lists of personnel were prepared with a one-month delay. In UNMEE, 20 international civilian staff members, who had already left the mission, were on a main roster of international staff and on a list of essential international staff of the mission. In the opinion of OIOS, these identified shortcomings were caused by a poor security warden system. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNMEE was in the process of updating its list of current staff members.*

51. The security warden system in 14 out of 20 audited missions was deficient or needed improvement. For example:

(a) The UNMIK warden system failed, during the March 2004 incidents, owing to a failure of communications and a lack of training/drills for the wardens and the staff. The UNOCI warden system was also found ineffective. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNMIK had updated and improved its warden system. The Mission has linked its check-in/check-out process with the system of the security section to provide an overview of the Mission's personnel, including the timely update of the warden system. Additionally, UNMIK has distributed hand-held radios to international and national staff members;*

(b) A radio check revealed that the whereabouts of more than 60 UNAMA staff in Kabul were unknown on any given day;

(c) Security wardens in UNMIL were not adequately trained and were appointed for zones other than their residence areas. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNMIL had prepared comprehensive briefing packages that were issued to all wardens. Every warden had been given a copy of the conceptual idea and general overview of the UNMIL-wide security plan.*

52. In some missions, staff members were not aware of their security wardens, and internal communications between staff and the mission security section was poor.

C. Determination of "security phases" needs to be clarified

53. The United Nations employs five specific security phases to describe the security measures to be implemented in a given country based on the prevailing security conditions. The designated official, after consultation with the security management team (for phases I and II) and authorization by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and by the Secretary-General (for phases III, IV and V), may declare the security phases in his/her respective region.

54. OIOS compared the security phases in several missions and noted a disparity in how security phases are determined. In addition, in some cases, missions in contiguous areas of conflict have different security phases, which were driven by factors having little to do with security, such as, family conveniences and monetary allowances, thus undermining the effectiveness and credibility of security objectives and inherent processes. For example, there are different phases in Israel/West Bank/Gaza, while the particular conflict is non-discriminatory as to where the violence or potential for violence may take place. In the opinion of OIOS, the UNTSO mission area of operations designated as security phase I needs to be reviewed, in the light of the continuously unsettled security environment in the region.

55. In another case, as indicated in paragraph 21 above, the unclear chain of command and reporting procedures between Headquarters and the security staff from different agencies and the failure of the two designated officials for security in Eritrea to coordinate and agree caused confusion as to who had the authority to declare or revise a security phase in the country and to approve staff members' non-duty travel to a phase III location.

56. For example, in February 2004, the country designated official declared the Asmara-Massawa road as phase III. On 25 February, the mission security management team discussed the implications of phase III, which was approved by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. The phase III announcement was viewed as negative since UNMEE staff travelled to Massawa for rest and recreation. The security team was concerned that the declaration would adversely affect civilian and military staff morale since the mission did not have the occasional recovery break privileges or alternative recreational options. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a designated official for the mission area of operations, designated the Asmara-Massawa road and the city of Massawa as part of the mission area, thereby nullifying the country designated official's declaration to phase III, effectively returning it to a phase I status. Mission personnel were allowed to travel to the area.

57. As a result, United Nations staff operated under different security phases in the same location for different United Nations organizations. *The Department of Safety and Security commented that the difficult situation had arisen from the arrangement made prior to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 59/276, section XI, whereby United Nations civilian staff members of peacekeeping missions did not fall under the authority of the designated official appointed under the aegis of the United Nations field security management system.* The decision of UNMEE to de facto ignore the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator phase III declaration in certain parts of Eritrea is similar to a criticism in the 20 October 2003 report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of United Nations personnel in Iraq which stated that "United Nations security policies and decisions bear a definite political dimension that often supersedes the security interest involved in protecting its staff".

D. Minimum operating security standards need to be established by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator as a policy requirement for missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

58. As indicated in paragraph 16 above, although the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator had recommended the use of minimum operating security standards, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had not established minimum operating security standards as a policy requirement at Department-led missions. However, OIOS noted that minimum operating security standards requirements were being used by Department-led missions in implementing their security management programmes. As a result, the Department-led missions de facto use minimum operating security standards for implementation of their security programmes, while de jure they are not subject to the minimum operating security standards requirements.

VI. Budgeting and resourcing

59. The main concerns identified by OIOS at several missions, including the United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), UNAMA, UNDOF, UNMEE, UNMIL and UNMIK, were the lack of resources to organize the security function in compliance with minimum operating security standards requirements, the standard operating procedures and field security policy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the understaffing of skilled security personnel. As a result, the missions were not fully compliant with mandated security requirements and were not capable of effectively managing their security operations. OIOS is pleased to note that in his report dated 11 October 2004 (A/59/365) the Secretary-General stressed the need for a significant increase in the number of security personnel, particularly in the field, in order to provide an adequate level of security for United Nations staff working in various duty stations.

60. The OIOS review of budgeting for security requirements also showed that expected accomplishments, performance indicators and outputs relating to security were not included or clearly set out in the budget. These weaknesses in budget planning were observed at 17 duty stations, including MINURSO, UNMIL, the United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP), UNOMIG and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

61. Separate lines for security costs had not been established in the mission budgets. Allotted funds for security posts, training and equipment were included in the total amount of the mission's expenditure category. In the opinion of OIOS, the establishment of separate budget lines for security costs will facilitate the planning and monitoring of expenditures related to security operations in the missions.

62. In some cases, the mission improperly estimated their budget requirements. For example, UNMEE estimated the costs for relocating its headquarters in Asmara at $7 million, and submitted its proposal to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which approved it in June 2004. However, at the time of the audit, financial provisions for securing the new site had not been included in the approved amount. Also, the UNMEE Security Section was not included in the consultative process for selecting the new sites.

63. In another case, MINURSO requested a budget increase of about $3 million for fiscal year 2003/04 to cover the cost of 22 international staff posts and 45 national staff posts to strengthen the mission's security function as a result of a security technical review by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. However, there was no correspondence between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and MINURSO on this issue, and the request was apparently not answered by the Department.

64. In May 2003, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations instructed MINURSO to plan its requirements on the assumption that it would continue at its current strength. MINURSO informed OIOS that, based on this instruction, the mission had not requested additional security staff in its 2004/05 budget submission.

VII. Deployment and administration of personnel

A. Human resources management needs improvement

65. In several missions, staffing in the security sections was inadequate. The vacancy rate for the security functions varied from 39.6 per cent in UNMIL to 86.2 per cent in UNOCI. According to the Chief Security Officer in UNMIK, the Security Section was dangerously close to being ineffective owing to understaffing and the inappropriate security skills and experience of current staff. The performance of the security function was also hampered by the absence of a civilian mission security officer position in UNDOF, and by the absence of a qualified and competent security analyst in UNAMA.

66. Some missions had difficulties in the timely recruiting of skilled and experienced security personnel for various reasons such as the severity of conditions, low level post classification and inadequate compensation. In some missions, vacancies remained open for two years. The lack of funding was another reason for understaffing in some missions, such as MINURSO, UNOMB and UNMIK. Security resources were not always used efficiently. At UNTSO security personnel performed non-security-related functions.

B. Security training and staff awareness require more emphasis

67. Security and stress management training is mandatory for all designated officials and members of security bodies, who are responsible for ensuring that staff are provided with adequate training and are aware of security arrangements and procedures. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator provides specific training to the designated officials and members of security management teams at field locations, develops training programmes and issues information booklets on security issues for United Nations staff members. In 2003, the Office developed a training programme on basic security in the field, focusing on staff safety, health and welfare. This programme was designed to raise the awareness of staff members to potential dangers they may face in field missions. The Office and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations also organized regular training workshops for the chief security officers from all peacekeeping missions.

68. While OIOS acknowledges the efforts of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to develop and provide a continuous security programme, it found that training remained a major concern in many field missions. Some designated officials had not obtained proper training, and the security staff was not adequately trained. For example, the designated officials and the security management team members in UNMOGIP had not been provided with such training, and the UNOMIG security officers had not received sufficient training, other than firearms training.

69. OIOS also found that, although at majority of missions all staff members had received induction/orientation on security matters upon their arrival at the duty station, the level of staff awareness to potential threats and knowledge of security procedures was alarmingly low in some missions including UNOWA, UNMISET and UNMIL. For example, many UNMIL staff members were unfamiliar with the mission evacuation plan, did not know their security wardens and had not been briefed on security procedures. In UNMISET, 80 per cent of interviewed personnel had not completed the basic security training developed by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that, following the audit, UNMISET had taken measures to ensure that all staff complied with the requirement to complete the security course and that more than 90 per cent of the Mission's staff members had completed the course as at 4 January 2005.*

70. In other missions, such as UNMEE, mission staff had not shown maturity or responsibility by actively considering advice provided by the security section that was relevant to their personal safety. Moreover, in some countries with no security phase (e.g., Senegal), management and staff did not fully appreciate the importance of the security function.

71. Improvement is also needed with regard to maintaining the database on lessons learned for the management and staff of the missions. Some missions had no centralized database of lessons learned/best practices. OIOS found that 14 of the 20 audited missions had no documented guidance for the identification of security-related lessons identified and best practices.

72. The above findings are similar to those identified by the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel, which stated in its report that "many staff members who were present in Baghdad at the time of the attack were not adequately trained or prepared for deployment in a combat zone. It is also apparent that before the attack, some staff ignored basic security instructions in relation to communications, travel and attending security briefings. Several agencies paid scant regard to basic security issues, like the completion of the CD-ROM on basic security and minimum operating security standards compliance. This made it extremely difficult for the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator staff to carry out their functions". OIOS is concerned with the lack of security training and inadequate staff awareness of security procedures in some missions. This creates a serious risk to the United Nations security programme, in general, and to personal safety of United Nations staff members in field missions, in particular.

73. In this regard, OIOS welcomes the constructive measures proposed by the Secretary-General in his report of 11 October 2004 (A/59/365, para. 58) concerning the establishment and the oversight of a sustained and coherent security training programme aimed at multiple clients: the security officers at headquarters and field

duty stations, the designated officials, the security management teams and security-related training for United Nations staff in general.

VIII. Physical security

74. In some missions, security arrangements were insufficient for officials designated as "at risk" by virtue of their responsibilities; the close protection detail was not provided to high-ranking official(s) and security guards were not armed. Physical security arrangements were not fully in line with threat assessment at 10 duty stations. The OIOS review of physical security measures relating to safeguarding personnel and securing the United Nations premises identified weaknesses in the missions, as illustrated below.

A. Security of personnel needs strengthening

75. *High-level management was not adequately safeguarded.* In UNAMA, the security procedures of the Close Protection Unit, manned by the French army, had not been aligned with the security procedures of UNAMA/Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, compromising the personal security of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The audit also found that the Representative of the Secretary-General in BONUCA urgently needed additional protection.

76. *United Nations security personnel did not carry weapons.* While the Governments of Morocco and Algeria and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Frente Polisario) provide a police escort and security to the duty station, MINURSO security officers did not carry weapons, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General did not have a personal bodyguard. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator need to provide guidance regarding whether United Nations security officers should carry weapons. In 12 missions, there was no qualified weapon instructor to security staff.

77. *Access control was inadequate.* In some missions, access control procedures relating to visitors' identification, registration and physical screening needed to be improved. Inadequate access control was observed at 17 of the 20 audited duty stations. At UNMEE, poor control of identification cards had caused absence without leave and situations when terminated local staff continued to have access to UNMEE facilities and equipment. Access to the UNTOP building by visitors, who have unrestricted access, posed a risk of entry by individuals who could jeopardize the security of United Nations staff and facilities.

B. Securing of premises needs to be improved

78. *United Nations premises were inadequately secured.* In Zugdidi (UNOMIG), no blast proof protective film was installed on the windows of the office buildings, including the room where the military observers hold their meetings. Perimeter security and physical access control to the United Nations premises was inadequate in some missions, including UNFICYP, UNIFIL and UNAMA. *The Department of*

Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNIFIL and UNFICYP were in the process of strengthening their perimeter security and access controls throughout their mission areas.

79. *Non-compliance with minimum operating security standards requirements.* The 50-metre stand-off zone required by minimum operating security standards was not established in several missions (UNMIK and MONUC). In UNMEE, key installations central to evacuating United Nations staff (e.g., the Communication Centre and the United Nations airport at Asmara) have not received security improvements.

80. *Lack of devices for security protection.* At the Sukhumi airport, which is a main access point for UNOMIG, no X-ray machine had been installed for security purposes. UNOMIG had no equipment to detect letter bombs. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNOMIG had installed an X-ray machine at the Sukhumi airport and that the Mission was in the process of installing blast protection film in its offices at Zugdidi, which was expected to be completed in February 2005. Furthermore, UNOMIG had provided in its 2005/06 budget for equipment for detecting letter bombs.*

81. *Residential area was not adequately secured.* Only 4 of the 60 houses that accommodated UNAMA staff in Kabul have been certified as complying with minimum operating residential security standards.

82. In the opinion of OIOS, the above observations represent serious shortcomings in the physical security of United Nations personnel and premises which need to be corrected.

C. Security and protection equipment needs to be procured

83. OIOS also reviewed the adequacy of equipment for the security function in field missions (i.e., security and protection equipment, security devices, supply and medical kits, transportation and communication equipment). Some missions were adequately equipped with security supplies and devices; however, a lack of funding for the purchase of transportation, communication and other equipment and supplies for security purposes, as well as delayed procurement of the equipment, were the main areas of concern in several missions, including UNDOF, UNOCI, UNTSO, UNMIL and UNAMSIL. In the opinion of OIOS, these problems undermine the missions' capability to effectively discharge their security mandate.

84. For example, UNDOF required funding for equipment necessary for medical evacuation of personnel deployed in remote areas. In UNOCI, the acquisition of a significant amount of security equipment, including radios, needed to be completed. At the time of the audit, no security and safety equipment had been acquired by UNMIL, although it had requested such equipment from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in October 2003. The requisition was approved only in May 2004, and no action has been taken in relation to this requisition. Since the mission was in the last month of the budget period, the entire list of equipment was re-budgeted for the new accounting period.

85. In view of security phases at the above missions, OIOS is concerned about the lax attempts to procure the much-needed equipment. The above examples demonstrate the need for urgent measures on the part of the missions' management

to procure required equipment for the missions' security function. OIOS believes that the acquisition of security and safety equipment can be expedited through the more active use of the strategic deployment stock at Brindisi, Italy, and the use of system contracts.

IX. Recommendations

86. OIOS makes the following recommendations on the basis of its audit findings made during the global audit of field security management:[1]

Recommendation 1

87. The Secretary-General should issue a single policy document/manual incorporating all security-related directives and procedures in one compendium accessible by all entities of the United Nations system to facilitate the implementation and monitoring of security management programmes (AP2004/600/16/01) (paras. 14-17).

88. *The Department of Safety and Security, on behalf of the Secretary-General, commented that the recommendation was accepted in principle. An early task of the new Department of Safety and Security would be to survey and assess existing directives and procedures and to develop a work plan for their updating, expansion and, where appropriate, consolidation. As there was no dedicated functional capacity within the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator for producing policies and procedures, and given the lead times in establishing and staffing the Department, it was unlikely that major work beyond a preliminary survey could commence before the last quarter of 2005.*

Recommendation 2

89. The Secretary-General should ensure that the roles and responsibilities of all individuals, who are expected to carry out security functions in the field are clearly formulated in the security policy documents, and that additional clarification on the functions of security officials are provided to the missions, when needed (AP2004/600/16/02) (paras. 18 and 19).

90. *The Department of Safety and Security, on behalf of the Secretary-General, accepted the recommendation and stated that the task had begun with the updating of the framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system (A/57/365) as mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution 59/276.*

Recommendation 3

91. The Secretary-General should ensure that the appointment of designated officials and their deputies is consistent with the United Nations security management accountability framework, and consideration needs to be given to security-related resources of the mission and managerial ability of the appointee to exercise security-related duties (AP2004/600/16/03) (paras. 20-22).

[1] The symbols in parentheses in this section refer to an internal code used by OIOS for recording recommendations and to related paragraphs of the report.

92. *The Department of Safety and Security, on behalf of the Secretary-General, accepted the recommendation and stated that it was an ongoing task. The Department intends to work closely with UNDP, which provided 85 per cent of designated officials, in improving selection and training.*

Recommendation 4

93. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should direct all designated officials and heads of mission to take urgent measures to improve security training for all levels of United Nations staff at duty stations and to increase staff awareness of the security arrangements (AP2004/600/16/04) (paras. 31 and 69-71).

94. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that the basic training programmes were in place and that it was an ongoing task, the performance evaluation and management of which were expected to improve once the dedicated compliance, evaluation and monitoring unit had been established within the new Department.*

Recommendation 5

95. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should instruct the designated officials and heads of mission to ensure that the composition and performance of the security management teams at the countrywide and mission level met the requirements established in the relevant United Nations security policy documents (AP2004/600/16/05) (paras. 24-28).

96. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that the basic instructions and guidelines were in place.*

Recommendation 6

97. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should instruct the heads of mission and the designated officials to improve the warden system in their respective duty stations and to ensure that the missions maintain updated staff lists, including dependants where applicable, at all times showing the location and contact information for each person (AP2004/600/16/06) (paras. 49-52).

98. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that the basic instructions and guidelines were in place. The Department also commented that it had embarked on an information technology project that was intended, in due course, to be of assistance to both the field and Headquarters in enhancing security clearances and personnel tracking.*

Recommendation 7

99. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should establish a viable mechanism to ensure that the mission and countrywide security plans are complete, updated and tested, and report on non-compliance with those requirements to the Secretary-General (AP2004/600/16/07) (paras. 44-48).

100. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that the basic instructions and guidelines were in place. The new Department structure, once implemented in the course of the year 2005, would also relieve the regional desk officers in New York of training, compliance visits and other functional responsibilities, enabling them to focus more attention on the review of country security plans.*

Recommendation 8

101. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should ensure that the missions adhere to established guidelines and requirements for providing close protection to senior officials in peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions (AP2004/600/16/08) (paras. 75-77).

102. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that the United Nations, as a whole, currently suffered from serious capacity and technical shortcomings in the realm of personal protection. The Department also indicated that rectifying the problem would be an important element of the Department work plan. While the problem was recognized as urgent, further analysis was required before the Department could posit milestones. In the interim, the Organization would have no option but to continue to rely in many countries on whatever assistance could be arranged, on a case-by-case basis, with Member States.*

Recommendation 9

103. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should request all designated officials and heads of mission to report on the measures taken to improve physical security in their respective areas of operations (AP2004/600/16/09) (paras. 74-82).

104. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that it was an ongoing task. The Division of Safety and Security Services, once established within the Department, would have as an early task the review and upgrading of policy, procedures, techniques and standards for physical security.*

Recommendation 10

105. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should, when establishing standard operating procedures for peacekeeping missions, address the diversity of security management programmes, the broad spectrum of mission operations, and security control environments depending on whether security functions are performed by military or civilian personnel (AP2004/600/16/10) (paras. 30-33).

106. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that it looked forward to the guidance of the Department of Safety and Security on the establishment of standard operating procedures to address the diversity of security management programmes and the broad spectrum of mission operations based on the sets of standard operating procedures already implemented on a routine basis by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator for the agencies, funds and programmes.*

Recommendation 11

107. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should revise the relevant security documents to include the objectives and terms of reference for security management teams established at the mission level and their coordination with countrywide security management teams (AP2004/600/16/11) (para. 29).

108. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that it would lend its support to the Department of Safety and Security in its effort to streamline the coordination of the various stakeholders at the country level.*

Recommendation 12

109. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should ensure the establishment of proper reporting lines and accountability mechanisms concerning security matters in field missions (AP2004/600/16/12) (paras. 35, 37 and 38).

110. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that it was likely that the establishment of the Department of Safety and Security and the request by the General Assembly for the Secretary-General to present a report on an accountability framework for the United Nations security management system, as a whole, at the sixtieth session of the Assembly would introduce new elements in the reporting and accountability lines of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; however, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations believed that it was too early to assess the nature and extent of such changes.*

Recommendation 13

111. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should review the current practices for recruiting chief security officers, align position classifications to actual responsibilities to be performed by an incumbent and reassess the grades at which security officers are appointed (AP2004/600/16/13) (para. 36).

112. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that, as was the case with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, the Department of Safety and Security would continue to play a major role in establishing the requirements and benchmarks as well as contributing to the selection and recruitment process of all security personnel to be deployed in peacekeeping operations. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations also stated that it recognized that there were difficulties in the timely recruitment of skilled and experienced personnel and that in order to meet the challenge of increased demands for existing, expanding and new peacekeeping operations, it maintained, in close consultation with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, a roster of candidates for all levels in the security field.*

Recommendation 14

113. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should issue a directive to peacekeeping missions requiring them to use the minimum operating security standards, as developed by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, when implementing their respective security management programmes (AP2004/600/16/14) (paras. 26 and 58).

114. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that, in coordination with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, it was in the process of finalizing a draft of mission-specific minimum operating security standards for peacekeeping operations. The Department further stated that while it understood that in the future, the Department of Safety and Security would have the responsibility for establishing the security standards to which civilian staff must abide in peacekeeping operations and ensure their compliance to such standards, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations intended to issue its minimum operating security standards as an interim measure.*

Recommendation 15

115. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should request the Controller to establish separate budget lines in peacekeeping missions' budgets for the security function, to facilitate the planning and monitoring of expenditures related to security operations (AP2004/600/16/15) (paras. 60-62).

116. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations accepted the recommendation and stated that it would raise the subject with the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts.*

Recommendation 16

117. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should review obstacles that have resulted in understaffing of security posts and take immediate steps to recruit staff for vacant security officer posts (AP2004/600/16/16) (paras. 59, 63 and 64).

118. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that in order for the security focal point to monitor the status of the Department's security recruitment, it was now a requirement for the Personnel Management and Support Service to provide, on a monthly basis to the focal point, an update on the status of the Department's security recruitment for all international staff. The Department added that similar efforts were under way to ensure that missions' chief security officers provided the security personnel staffing list to the Department's security focal point on a monthly basis. However, the Department pointed out that the long-term success of its security staffing strategy depended on the capacity of the Department of Safety and Security to assume that responsibility from the two staff members in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations temporarily supporting the effort. The Department also indicated that the termination of the current arrangement in the Department would, within a few months, shift the entire responsibility of the day-to-day management of, and advice to, the Department's field security staff to the Department of Safety and Security.*

Recommendation 17

119. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should, in conjunction with the Procurement Service, streamline the procedure for acquiring essential security and safety equipment such as protection devices, supply and medical kits, transportation and communication equipment (AP2004/600/16/17) (paras. 76 and 77).

120. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that a two-phased security review of all peacekeeping missions had been conducted, with a view to identifying ways and means to strengthen the security management in peacekeeping*

missions, including the acquisition of essential security equipment. The Department added that it had adopted a systems contract approach for the procurement of security equipment.

Recommendation 18

121. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should ensure that the strategic deployment stocks at Brindisi, Italy, had essential security equipment available for rapid deployment to new missions (AP2004/600/16/18) (para. 83).

122. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that it had reviewed the composition of the strategic deployment stocks in July 2004 to reflect the changes in the global security environment, operational nature of peacekeeping activities, technological advances, discontinuation of particular products and changes in the business environment. The Department further stated that the strategic deployment stocks composition would be reviewed annually to ensure that the stock held to support rapid deployment was constantly updated and met the changing requirements. The Department also indicated that it had developed a list of security equipment items, which, once approved by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, would have an impact on the composition of strategic deployment stocks.*

Recommendation 19

123. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator should ensure that the designated officials take actions to improve coordination at the countrywide and mission level and to strengthen communication and cooperation with the respective host Governments and external military forces (AP2004/600/16/19) (paras. 39-42).

124. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that the basic instructions and guidelines were in place. The Department added that regional desk officers at Headquarters, as they were freed of other tasks through the full implementation of the Department structure, would also be able to provide more sustained and focused supervision to the specific security management arrangements of individual countries.*

Recommendation 20

125. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator should clarify the authority and mechanisms regarding the declaration and revision of security phases (AP2004/600/16/20) (paras. 20 and 53-57).

126. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted in part the recommendation and stated that the criteria, authority and mechanisms for declaring and revising security phases were set out in the United Nations* Field Security Handbook. *The Department further stated that the principal difficulty was lack of capacity at Headquarters to review security phases on a regular basis so as to ensure that they remained commensurate with the activities, and associated threats and risks, of the United Nations presence and activities in every country or portion thereof.*

(*Signed*) **Dileep Nair**
Under-Secretary-General
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